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Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and earning management. The data set covers 107 firms‘data listed on Istanbul Stock 
Exchange for the period 2006–2007.  In the study, accrual is used as an earning management 
indicator. Publicly offering rate, board of directors and duality are used alternative proxies for 
corporate governance indicators. Regression and correlation analysis are used. According to the 
results, there is a negative relationship between earning management and corporate governance 
indicators.  This negative relationship is statistically significant for duality variables. An important 
finding from the study is that corporate management has extensively been adopted accordingly in 





The increasing number of corporate scandals in the last five years have stained corporate governance 
reputation and questioned the effectiveness of its current structure. As a result, corporate governance has received 
attention from policymakers, investors, corporate boards (Donker ve Zahir, 2008). Corporate governance has become 
a popular topic in the international academic and business debate (Bebchuk and Cohen 2009). Corporate governance 
is of critical importance not only to the companies‘ directors who are interested in knowing the level of their 
companies governance structure and compliance with best practices and regulations, but to market participants who 
are keenly interested in the governance risks associated with companies. 
Corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that affect how a corporation is operated. It deals with the 
welfares and goals of all the stakeholders, including shareholders, management, board of directors, lenders, 
regulators, and the economy as a whole. La Porta, et al. (2000) Defined, ―Corporate governance is, to a certain 
extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the 
insiders.‖ They define ―the insiders‖ as both managers and controlling shareholders.  The purpose of corporate 
governance is to achieve the best overall welfare of all stakeholders and promote economic efficiency both internally 
and externally. Empirical research on corporate governance is based on the theoretical framework of agency theory 
advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983), with a focus on the principal-
agent problem. In corporations, principal-agent problem occurs when the interest of managers (the agent) is not in 
line with the interest of owners (the principal).  
Firms with good governance are assumed to provide transparent disclosures of the allocation of decision 
and control rights between the firm and its investors thereby making them more investor-friendly than firms that do 
not. Therefore, because ‗‗better governance enables firms to access capital markets on better terms‖ (Doidge et al., 
2007), good governance practices should positively impact a firm‘s valuation and market performance. 
The concept of corporate governance evokes the question of corporate performance and higher returns in 
the case of companies complying with certain rules. The research on these relations constitute a substantial 
proportion of papers in modern management, finance as well as law and economics. Researchers have investigated 
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relationships between company performance and corporate governance variables such as ownership structure 
(concentration, shareholder identity), board structure (composition, turnover, proportion of independent, 
insider/outside or affiliated members), structure and functioning of board committees, structure and size of executing 
compensation (fixed salary vs. incentives programs and stock options), structure and size of debt (long vs. short term, 
private vs. public). Although, the research findings remain relatively mixed, many results do reveal clear relations 
between governance characteristics and performance (Aluchna, 2009). 
One of the most important functions of corporate governance is to ensure the quality of the financial 
reporting process. The issue of corporate governance has become more important due to the highly publicized 
financial reporting frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and Parmalat, in particular, and a very high level of 
earnings restatements. While there is an extensive literature on opportunistic earnings management in response to 
specific incentives to achieve one result or another, research looking at the impact of corporate governance on 
earnings management is quite limited. The few papers that address these issues (e.g., Klein (2002)) focus more on 
the magnitude than the direction of earnings management, and thus shed little light on the ability of these variables to 
offset the one-sided incentive of management to increase reported earnings that results from stock and option-based 
compensation. More recently, Cornett et al. (2008) examine the impact of incentive-based compensation and 
corporate governance on firm performance in light of potential earnings management. They find that incentive-based 
compensation has a significant impact on financial performance as measured by reported earnings. However, once 
earnings are adjusted for discretionary accruals the link between compensation and performance disappears. In 
contrast, the estimated impact of corporate governance variables on performance more than doubles when 
discretionary accruals are removed from measured profitability. 
Shah et all (2009) examines the relationship between quality of Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Management for Pakistani companies. As the result of their analysis they found that indicates the presence of 
Positive relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. Cornett et all, (2006) examines 
whether corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings management at the largest publicly traded bank holding 
companies in the United States. They found that the use of discretionary accruals is positively related to a bank‘s 
unmanaged operating performance, capital ratios, and asset size. In contrast, the use of discretionary accruals is 
negatively related to a bank‘s non-discretionary accruals and market-to-book ratios. 
  Prencipe and Bar-Yosef (2009) examines the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management 
in family-controlled companies. Their empirical results provide evidence that the impact of board independence on 
earnings management is indeed weaker in family-controlled companies. The same result also holds for the lack of 
CEO/board chairman duality function. Such effects become stronger in cases where the CEO is a member of the 
controlling family. 
Liu and Lu (2007) examine the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China 
by introducing a tunneling perspective. They empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance 
levels have lower levels of earnings management. 
Ahmed et all (2008) examining whether monitoring mechanisms play a role in constraining earnings 
management resulting from equity incentives. They show that equity incentives are not positively associated with 
abnormal accruals suggesting that they seem to align manager interests with shareholder interests rather than 
motivate opportunistic earnings manipulation. 
Corporate governance models can vary according to the system of corporate ownership and management 
control mechanisms prevailing in a country. In Turkey, a market-oriented corporate governance and control system 
cannot be said to exist, since the flotation ratios of listed companies and share dispersion levels are low.  
According to a corporate governance study conducted in 2003,18 the flotation ratio of listed companies in 
Turkey is approximately 15–20 per cent, while only 15 per cent of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) 100 Index 
companies have a flotation ratio of more than 50 per cent. In practice, Turkish companies are characterized by the 
existence of one or more majority shareholders owning controlling blocks of shares. Furthermore, unlike in some 
other European countries, the system is not bank-based, as a domination of banks over companies does not seem to 
exist either through ownership of shares.19 or through the exercise of voting rights for shares held in custody.20 
Instead, most large corporations are held by families or individuals.21 Hence, the Turkish corporate ownership and 
management control system can be generally classified as insider controlled (Nilsson, 2007). 
The main purpose of this study examines how corporate governance mechanisms affect earnings 
management. Public offerinf rate, size of executive board and duality are used as alternative indicators for the 
corporate governance. For Turkey, an indicator has not been defined yet. In the study two control variables are 
included in the model.  According to the results, there is a negative relationship between earnings management and 
corporate management. Another findings indicates that the earning management has extensively been adopted in 
large firms and firms with low leverage rates. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our research design choices and their 
rationale. The results are presented in Section 3 and the conclusion in Section 4.  
 
2. Research Design 
 
The purpose of this paper examines relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. 
In this paper, we examine companies listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange during the period of 2006 to 2007. Because 
of the difference in their asset structures, banks and participation banks, insurance firms, leasing and factoring firms, 
real estate investment trust and security investment trusts are not taken to the sample. Hence 107 firms covered in the 
study. 
Measuring corporate governance is difficult because it cannot be directly observed and it usually involves 
multiple dimensions. While there is no consensus on how corporate governance can be measured, prior literature 
suggests several different ways to proxy for corporate governance. For instance, Bai et al. (2004) use both internal 
single dimensions, such as ownership structure, executive compensation, board of directors and financial disclosure, 
and external single dimensions, such as external takeover market, legal infrastructure, and product market 
competition. Gompers et al. (2003) create a 24-factor G-index to measure corporate governance and Brown and 
Caylor (2006) use 51 corporate governance provisions to create a broader measure. Other empirical studies examine 
the impact of a single dimension of corporate governance, such as ownership concentration and the separation of 
CEO and the chairman of the board. In this study, we use to measure corporate governance three variables: Publicly 
Offering Rate (POR), Board of Directors (BSIZE) and Duality.  
The variables used are defined as; POR, firms‘ public offering rate. BSIZE, The number of board members. 
Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) argue that small boards are more effective in monitoring managerial behavior as 
the smaller group forces members to be more engaged. Larger boards can also result in a free-rider problem where 
the addition of directors causes the overall monitoring to decrease as directors may rely on other directors to monitor 
managers. This is also consistent with Beasley (1996) who finds that companies with larger board sizes are more 
prone to fraud compared to those with smaller boards. However, Klein (2002) argues that large boards allow for 
directors to specialize in monitoring and have greater diversity among the committees of the board resulting in 
greater monitoring. Additionally, the larger the board, the greater the likelihood different perspectives on 
opportunities facing the corporation may be heard.  
DUALITY a binary variable is used as a proxy for duality. This binary variable takes the value of one if the 
CEO also served as chairman of the board and zero otherwise. Separating the position of the CEO from the position 
of Chairman of the Board helps delineate the decision making authority of the CEO from the monitoring and 
oversight activities of the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). If a single person simultaneously holds both 
positions the likelihood of material misstatement increases as important decisions may not be reviewed by the board 
and actions inconsistent with the corporation‘s controls may be taken. 
Consistent with previous research, discretionary accruals are used to identify earnings management. We use 
a modified version of the Jones model (Dechow, 1996). Discretionary accruals from regressions of total accruals on 
changes in sales and on property, plant, and equipment within industries. 
 
 TACC = NI − OCF (1) 
Where; 
TACC: Total accrual 
NI: Net Income 
OCF: Operating Cash Flow  
NDCA it = α1 (1/ TA i, t-1) + α2 [(ΔREV it –ΔARit)/TA i, t-1] (2) 
Where; 
NDCAit: is nondiscretionary accrual in year t scaled by lagged total assets 
TAi, t-1: is a total asset at the end of year t -1 
ΔREV it = is revenues in year t 
ΔARit = is net receivables in year t   
 
Our control variables include leverage and firm size. We have used a logarithmic transformation of the 
2006–2007 total assets to use our size variable (SIZE). Leverage provides a mechanism to curb agency costs, so the 
use of leverage as a control variable is warranted in this study. Our leverage variable is calculated as a ratio by 
dividing the firm‘s total debt by its total assets for each calendar year. 
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Considering theoretical discussions and empirical studies (Shah et all, 2009; Cornett et all, 200/) the model has been 
set in order to test the relationship between corporate governance and earning management as is below. 
 




Regression and correlation analyses are used. Table 1 shows the results of descriptive statistics to variables. 
The results of descriptive statistics indicates that mean return on assets (ACC) is about 3 % while mean POR is 33 % 
and BSIZE is 6, 6636. On the other hand the mean SIZE is 8.4554 and the mean LEV is 41 %. 
 
DEĞĠġKENLER N Mean Minimum Maximum St. Dev. 
ACC 214 ,0302 -,40 ,50 ,1241 
POR 214 ,3325 ,01 ,86 ,1879 
BSIZE 214 6,6636 3 13 1,9807 
DUALITY 214 ,5888 ,00 1 ,4943 
SIZE 214 8,4554 7,05 9,94 ,6735 
LEV 214 ,4172 ,05 ,90 ,2067 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 shows the results of correlation coefficients of variables used at the analysis. As it can be seen from 
the table negative and statistically significant results have been obtained between DUALITY and ACC. There is a 
very significantly negative relationship (5%) between duality and ACC. There exits a significantly (5%) negative 
relationship between duality and ROE and also significantly negative relationship (5%) between ACC and LEV. 
There is a positive relationship between ACC and SIZE. The correlation among the independent variables is low and 
less than 0.50, thus there is no multicollinearity problem in the model. 
 
DEĞĠġKENLER ACC POR BSIZE DUALITY SIZE LEV 
ACC 1      
POR -,103 1     
BSIZE ,167 -,174 1    
DUALITY -,269** ,055 -,066 1   
SIZE ,235* -,231* ,433** -,019 1  
LEV -,303** -,029 -,131 ,033 ,136 1 
**, * significant at 5 %  and 10 %, respectively. 
Table-2: Correlation Table 
 
Table 3 shows the results of regression analysis about financial performance. Model 1 searches the 
relationship between POR and ACC. When the results are examined it can be seen that there is a negative but 
statistically insignificant relationship between ACC and POR. According to the results of Model 2 which searches 
the relationship between ACC and BSIZE positive but still insignificant relationship can be observed. Model 3 
searches the relationship between DUALITY and ACC. When the results are examined it can be seen that there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship at 1% level between DUALITY and ACC. Dependence variables of two 
models have also negative relations with LEV and positive relations with SIZE. F-statistics values are significant at 
1% level for three of the models.  But adjusted R
2 
values are low for three of the models.  
Model 4 presents the regression of earning management on all variables. When the results are examined it 
can be seen that there is a statistically negative relationship between ACC and corporate governance variables. This 
negative relationship statistically significant at % 1 level between ACC and DUALITY. We do not find a significant 
















Model 1: Dependent 
Variable: ACC 
Model 2: Dependent 
Variable: ACC 
Model 3: Dependent 
Variable: ACC 
Model 4: Dependent 
Variable: ACC 
CONSTANT -,294 (-1,958)** -,323 (-2,265)**  -,261 (-1,771)* 
POR -,034 (-,553)   -,026 (-,434) 
BSIZE  ,000 (,003)  -,001 (-,198) 
DUALITY   -,063 (-2,928)*** -,063 (-2,883)*** 
SIZE ,050 (2,904)*** ,052 (2,760)*** , 051 (3,164)*** ,051 (2,748)*** 
LEV -,205 (-3,770)*** -,205 (-3,679)*** -,199 (-3,810)*** -,202 (-3,733)*** 
F-Statistic  7,138*** 7,016*** 10,456*** 16,208*** 
Adj. R2 ,148 ,145 ,211 ,297 
Observation 214 214 214 214 
***, ** and *  significant at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % , respectively. 




In this study, the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in Turkish Financial 
market. Data set covers 107 firms‘ data for 2006-2007 period. Public offering rate, the size of executive board and 
duality are used alternative indicators for corporate management. Corporate management is proxied by discretionary 
accruals. According to the results, a negative relationship is found significant at 1% level for duality variable. 
Another finding states that earnings management is extensively used in large firms and in firms with low leverage 
rate. 
In the literature, corporate governance index itself is used in econometric models. But due to a lack of this 
index, for Turkey, apart from the literature, the alternative indicators mentioned above are used as proxies for 
corporate governance. But the attempts are in process to estimate such an index for Turkey. 
Another difficulty arises from the insufficient number of the years used in the regression. As it can been 
seen that the larger is the period, the healthier might be the results. These two issues should be kept in mind for the 
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